hidden
Image Database Export Citations

Menu:

Factor Rents, Sole Ownership, and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Copes, Parzival en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T14:58:47Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T14:58:47Z
dc.date.issued 1972 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-12-03 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-12-03 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3234
dc.description.abstract "In the literature of fisheries economics there is a noticeable preoccupation with the phenomenon of resource rent dissipation. The common property nature of most fishery resources-with the attendant free entry of labour and capital-gives rise to 'problems' of 'overfishing'. If at any given level of fishing effort the resource should yield a rent to the marginal operator, additional factor inputs of labour and capital will be attracted that will depress the catch per unit of effort and lower returns to all operators. This process will continue until the revenue per unit of fishing effort is reduced to the level of its marginal opportunity cost. Thus the rent attributable to the resource, that formerly accounted for the excess of revenue over marginal opportunity cost, is eliminated." en_US
dc.subject fisheries en_US
dc.subject exploitation en_US
dc.title Factor Rents, Sole Ownership, and the Optimum Level of Fisheries Exploitation en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.subject.sector Fisheries en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 40 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 2 en_US
dc.identifier.citationmonth June en_US


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
13.pdf 894.4Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record