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International Cooperation and the International Commons

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dc.contributor.author Barrett, Scott en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T15:01:40Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T15:01:40Z
dc.date.issued 1999 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-03-05 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-03-05 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3484
dc.description.abstract "Efforts to sustain international cooperation invariably culminate in the signing of an international treaty, the success of which depends on the acumen of the individuals that negotiate it and the nature of the problem being addressed. But, while diplomats can make a difference, even the cleverest of diplomats cannot be relied upon to sustain first-best outcomes in all cases. Usually cooperation will be partial and there will be some loss in efficiency. International co-operation in these situations is analogous to domestic politics. Democracy may be the best system of government imaginable, but Arrow has taught us that we cannot rely on majority voting to sustain first-best outcomes every time." en_US
dc.subject property rights--international en_US
dc.subject environmental protection--international en_US
dc.subject global commons en_US
dc.subject privatization en_US
dc.subject regulation en_US
dc.subject pollution en_US
dc.subject trade en_US
dc.subject markets en_US
dc.title International Cooperation and the International Commons en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.subject.sector Global Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 10 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 1 en_US
dc.identifier.citationmonth January en_US

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