Further Experimental Investigations into Marketable Emissions Permits

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/361
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Elliot, Steven R.
Conference:	Inequality and the Commons, the Third Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location:	Washington, DC
Conf. Date:	September 17-20, 1992
Date:	1992
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/361
Sector:	Theory General & Multiple Resources
Region:	North America
Subject(s):	air pollution environment markets--models Clean Air Act IASC
Abstract:	"This paper examines the results of experiments designed to study various aspects of tradable emissions permits as set forth by the Clean Air Act of 1991. In particular, this paper develops an understanding of some of the results that we attained in our experimental work in this area at the Universities of Arizona and Colorado. In these experiments subjects acted as managers of firms that must trade emissions permits. After an initial allocation of permits, subjects were allowed to trade them in both an 'informal' double auction and are 'formal' revenue neutral auction or in some sessions just the 'formal' auction. Further, some sessions allowed subjects to hold permits across rounds for later use (intertemporal banking of permits), while others did not."

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