dc.contributor.author |
Christy, Francis |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Field, Barry |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Leal, Donald |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
Schlager, Edella |
en_US |
dc.contributor.author |
De Alessi, Michael |
en_US |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T15:10:05Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T15:10:05Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
1998 |
en_US |
dc.date.submitted |
2009-05-06 |
en_US |
dc.date.submitted |
2009-05-06 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3886 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
"Property rights theorists and others considering various conservation regimes often differentiate between common and private property rights institutions. There is a rich anthropology literature on common property and the efforts of groups and communities to conserve natural resources. There is also a rich economics literature on the importance of institutions and private property to conservation. Both rely on an institutional analysis of the incentives facing decision makers, but just what difference in any-- exists between common and private institutions is not well defined. An additional confusion arises from the fact that the word 'commons' has been used to describe open access areas to a strict set of rules governing behavior." |
en_US |
dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
dc.subject |
property rights |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Ostrom, Elinor |
en_US |
dc.title |
Common and Private Property Rights: A Roundtable Discussion |
en_US |
dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Center for Private Conservation, The Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC |
en_US |
dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |