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Abstract:
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"Common property is commonly viewed as the vestigial remains of a primitive, non-market economy. The regimes themselves are viewed as quaint, inefficient and unimportant to a modern economy. Prescriptive economists, for this reason, consistently urge the replacement of common property regimes with private property arrangements. From an institutionalist's perspective, whether this prescriptive view is correct or not depends upon the relative efficiency of common property regimes - efficiency in terms of the allocation and coordination of resource use. Put differently and in the form of a question, in a heterogeneous environment in which individuals and groups are free to chose among alternative institutions for the conduct of transactions, will common property institutions become extinct? In this paper I'd like to argue that the answer to this question is no and, if one admits that information and knowledge of even the most mundane varieties are valuable economic resources, that common property arrangements are much more common and important than is commonly realized."
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