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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Atzenhoffer, Jean-Philippe |
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Date:
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2008 |
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Agency:
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Series:
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Document de Travail, no. 21 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/3980
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
evolution
game theory
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Abstract:
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"The 'Tragedy of the Commons' refers to the dissipation of a common- pool ressource when any appropriator has free access to it. Under the behavior of absolute payoff maximisation, the common-pool resource game leads to a Nash equilibrium in which the resource is over-exploited. However, some empirical studies show that the over-utilization is even larger than the Nash equilibrium predicts. We account for these results in an evolutionary framework. Under an imitation-experimentation dynamics, the long run stable behavior implies a larger exploitation of the resource than in the classical Nash equilibrium."
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