Rent Dissipation and Probabilistic Destruction of Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/405
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy
Conference:	Common Property Conference, the Second Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property
Location:	Winnipeg, Manitoba
Conf. Date:	September 26-29
Date:	1991
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/405
Sector:	Social Organization Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	common pool resources user fees game theory modeling
Abstract:	"Using experimental methods to test a game theoretic model of destruction in a common pool resource environment, this paper investigates whether the possibility of destruction will significantly alter choice behavior in the resulting game. When there is a nonnegligible probability of destruction at the subgame perfect equilibrium, the common pool resource is in every case destroyed and, in most cases, rather quickly. Even when there is a second subgame perfect equilibrium which is completely safe and yields near optimal rents, subjects do not stabilize at this equilibrium. The consequence of this destruction is in every case a significant loss in rents."

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