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Abstract:
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"One of the key objectives of this paper is to underscore the idea that local user groups, under certain conditions, are able to self-organize and successfully govern their natural resources. Successful self-organized groups are not only able to craft optimal rules and enforce them at low costs but in many instances are also able to out-perform centrally governed resource systems. I draw on examples from the irrigation sector to show that farmer managed irrigation systems (FMIS) are consistently better at delivering water to their tail ends, maintaining their infrastructures, and realizing greater agricultural productivities than agency managed irrigation systems (AMIS). Farmers in FMIS are, therefore, able to ensure better water security to their members than their counterparts in AMIS.
"The paper is organized in the following manner. First, I provide a brief overview of the irrigation sector and its performance in Nepal. Second, I explore the incentive structures facing farmers in self-organized and in agency-managed systems to assess why farmers in the former system tend to be better motivated than those in the latter. Then, after reviewing the organization and governance structure of Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) I compare its performance with Agency Managed Irrigation Systems (AMIS). I then explore how resource settings may affect cooperation and conflict in self-organized systems before making policy recommendations on how performance can be improved in irrigation systems."
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