Image Database Export Citations


Effects of Agenda Access Costs in Spatial Committee Setting

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Herzberg, Roberta en_US
dc.contributor.author Wilson, Rick K. en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T15:13:44Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T15:13:44Z
dc.date.issued 1990 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-04-16 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2009-04-16 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4176
dc.description.abstract "In this paper we examine what decision making costs mean for outcomes in collective choice settings. Our specific focus is with simple majority rule spatial voting games. Wellknown findings for such games show that outcomes will cycle throughout the policy space given the frictionless nature of simple majority rule processes. Along with many others, we are uncomfortable with these theoretical results. Our discomfort stems from failing to observe such instability in natural empirical settings. Decision makers remind us that there are real costs to building agendas which are absent in our theoretical models. We use decision making costs as a way of introducing friction into the agenda process. Beginning from the same unconstrained spatial models, we introduce agenda access costs which we show are sufficient to induce equilibria in an otherwise unstable majority rule process." en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject committees en_US
dc.subject decision making en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject legislature en_US
dc.subject voting en_US
dc.title Effects of Agenda Access Costs in Spatial Committee Setting en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
effects_of_agen ... tial_committee_setting.pdf 274.4Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record