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Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action

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dc.contributor.author Ostrom, Elinor en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T15:14:04Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T15:14:04Z
dc.date.issued 2008 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-11-20 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2008-11-20 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4200
dc.description.abstract "Problems of the commons exist in a wide variety of settings ranging in size and complexity from the family (e.g., the household budget and the kitchen sink) to the global scale (e.g., loss of biodiversity and global warming). Game theory is a useful theoretical tool for representing a simplified, core social dilemma facing a set of individuals sharing a commons. Game theorists, who assume that individuals base decisions on immediate returns to self, frequently use the Prisoners' Dilemma game to represent the problem of the commons. The individuals in such a game are assumed to have complete information about the strategy space they face and the outcomes that will be obtained depending on their own and others' actions. On the other hand, the pure theory is about individuals who do not know one another, do not share a common history, and cannot communicate with one another. In this model, game theory predicts that individuals jointly using a commons will overharvest, leading to Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons.'" en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries W08-23 en_US
dc.subject commons en_US
dc.subject collective action en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.subject trust en_US
dc.title Building Trust to Solve Commons Dilemmas: Taking Small Steps to Test an Evolving Theory of Collective Action en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.submitter.email efcastle@indiana.edu en_US


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