| dc.contributor.author |
Faysse, Nicolas |
en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-07-31T15:14:58Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-07-31T15:14:58Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2002 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2002-07-01 |
en_US |
| dc.date.submitted |
2002-07-01 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4272 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
This paper tries to draw some main lines in the abundant
literature on economic analysis of Common Pool Resources. Some
promising articles likely to pave the way to future research are
more precisely presented.
The paper presents the initial externality problem and describes
the different ways which have been explored to enable cooperation
through the paradigm of a non cooperative setting. Basically, all
these approaches have tried to internalize the externalities using
the game characteristics: the game outcomes, the size of the
group, the game structure (e.g. repetition), the possibility of
behavioral norms or the interdependency between an appropriation
problem and a provision problem. Nevertheless, these approaches do
not tackle the possibility of a negotiated change in the rules.
The paper ends with some directions for future research. |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
collective action--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
new institutionalism |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--economics |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
tragedy of the commons |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
negotiation |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
heterogeneity |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
externalities |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Recent Results of New Institutional Economics as a Basis for Analyzing Common Pool Resources |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Literature Review |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
International Water Management Institute |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.submitter.email |
n.faysse@cgiar.org |
en_US |