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Cooperation in the Commons

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dc.contributor.author Polasky, Stephen en_US
dc.contributor.author Tarui, Nori en_US
dc.contributor.author Ellis, Gregory en_US
dc.contributor.author Mason, Charles en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2009-07-31T15:17:27Z
dc.date.available 2009-07-31T15:17:27Z
dc.date.issued 2006 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-09-04 en_US
dc.date.submitted 2007-09-04 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4456
dc.description.abstract "This paper delineates circumstances in which a first-best cooperative solution can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in a dynamic common property renewable resource game. In a game with nonlinear resource stock effects on cost, we characterize a worst perfect equilibrium that supports cooperation for the widest range of parameter values for the discount rate, resource growth rate, harvest price, and the number of resource exploiters. The strategy profile that we propose is consistent with human behavior observed in experiments and common property resource case studies." en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper, no. 07-11 en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.title Cooperation in the Commons en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Economic Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 29 en_US
dc.identifier.citationnumber 1 en_US
dc.identifier.citationmonth September en_US
dc.submitter.email nori@hawaii.edu en_US


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