Generating Distrust in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4676
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Type:	Working Paper
Author:	Ahn, Toh-Kyeong; Ostrom, Elinor; Schmidt, David; Shupp, Robert; Walker, James M.
Date:	1999
Agency:	Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN
Series:	Workshop Working Paper Series W99-1
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4676
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory trust social dilemmas prisoner's dilemma Workshop
Abstract:	"The impact of game parameters, social history, and endogenous group formation on the choice of strategies in repeated PD games is experimentally examined. Overall, rates of cooperation are quite low and decline with repetition of the game. On the other hand, rates of cooperation are increased by increases in the level of cooperators gain, as well as in groups that endogenously, via strategy selection, 'self-select' into subgroups of relatively high cooperators. Rates of cooperation are also increased in situations where subjects are repeatedly matched with the same person, relative to situations with random matching between decision rounds."

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