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Non-Transferable Utility Values of Voting Games

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Gardner, Roy
Date: 1987
Series: W87-19
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4723
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): game theory
social choice theory
Abstract: "A voting game is a non-transferable utility (NTU) game with a simple game structure. When the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game is strictly positive, then the corresponding voting game has a strict NTU value. Moreover, the Shapley-Shubik index is the unique NTU value for a certain class of voting games. These results lead to a solution of the problem of a group choosing its leader."

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