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Values of Voting Games

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Type: Conference Paper
Author: Gardner, Roy
Conference: World Congress of the Econometric Society
Location: Boston, MA
Conf. Date: August, 1985
Date: 1985
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10535/4725
Sector: Theory
Region:
Subject(s): game theory
voting--models
Workshop
Abstract: "The Shapley value of a simple game, also known as the Shapley-Shubik index of political power, measures the probability that a given player is pivotal. Pivoting means turning a losing coalition into a winning coalition. The higher this probability, the more likely a player is to influence the outcome; hence, the more powerful he is. This paper studies a class of generalizations of this index to nontransferable utility (NTU) games. The solution concept generalizing the Shapley value to such games is the NTU value. By the value of a voting game we mean then an NTU value."

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