Values of Voting Games

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4725
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Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Gardner, Roy
Conference:	World Congress of the Econometric Society
Location:	Boston, MA
Conf. Date:	August, 1985
Date:	1985
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4725
Sector:	Theory
Region:
Subject(s):	game theory voting--models Workshop
Abstract:	"The Shapley value of a simple game, also known as the Shapley-Shubik index of political power, measures the probability that a given player is pivotal. Pivoting means turning a losing coalition into a winning coalition. The higher this probability, the more likely a player is to influence the outcome; hence, the more powerful he is. This paper studies a class of generalizations of this index to nontransferable utility (NTU) games. The solution concept generalizing the Shapley value to such games is the NTU value. By the value of a voting game we mean then an NTU value."

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