| dc.contributor.author |
Gardner, Roy |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-09-02T20:30:01Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-09-02T20:30:01Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1985 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4725 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"The Shapley value of a simple game, also known as the Shapley-Shubik index of political power, measures the probability that a given player is pivotal. Pivoting means turning a losing coalition into a winning coalition. The higher this probability, the more likely a player is to influence the outcome; hence, the more powerful he is. This paper studies a class of generalizations of this index to nontransferable utility (NTU) games. The solution concept generalizing the Shapley value to such games is the NTU value. By the value of a voting game we mean then an NTU value." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
voting--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Values of Voting Games |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Game Theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
World Congress of the Econometric Society |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
August, 1985 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Boston, MA |
en_US |