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PDF
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Type:
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Conference Paper |
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Author:
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Landry, Rejean; Sabetti, Filippo |
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Conference:
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Advances in Comparative Institutional Analysis |
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Location:
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Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia |
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Conf. Date:
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Oct., 1987 |
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Date:
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1987 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4853
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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power
incentives
institutional analysis
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Abstract:
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"The growth of collective and public choice theory in more recent
times has led to a shift from studies of power and influence to studies of the structure of decision-making arrangements that affect the way power and influence are mobilized and exercised. Without denying the potential for some to exercise power over others within particular constitutional arrangements, the growth of public choice theory has extended consideration to many contexts in which, to paraphrase Mary Parker Follett (1951: 188-189), some citizens and officials have power with, rather than power over, others. This shift in orientation has led to a renewed appreciation of another concept whose roots are deep in our intellectual tradition and whose importance in the design, creation and maintenance of organizational arrangements may well outrank that of power."
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