| dc.contributor.author |
Shivakumar, Sujai |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-09-17T19:11:15Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-09-17T19:11:15Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1998 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/4916 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"There is no such thing as the market but rather nexus of exchange as circumscribed by certain rules. The patterns we observe as characteristics of varied markets are in turn dependant on the
presence or absence of various static and dynamic rule properties. This basic insight of Constitutional Political Economy extends here to consider the market for economic theory and public policy. Traditionally interpreted, policy action rests on advice developed scientifically from economic theory. However, the possibility exists for the invocation of economic arguments and the selection of policy among alternatives offered which suit political imperatives. In turn an inquiry into whether economic science drives policy or if political
imperatives select from rationalizing theories and theoretical frameworks would depend on how the market for public policy is structured." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rational choice theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
public policy--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
public choice--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
markets--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
political economy--theory |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Constitutional Constraints and the Market for Policy Advice |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Conference Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconference |
Colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfdates |
March 23 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationconfloc |
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
en_US |