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Using Cross-Cultural Experiments to Understand the Dynamics of Global Commons

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dc.contributor.author Carpenter, Jeffrey
dc.contributor.author Cárdenas, Juan-Camilo
dc.date.accessioned 2009-10-30T20:15:53Z
dc.date.available 2009-10-30T20:15:53Z
dc.date.issued 2001 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5127
dc.description.abstract "Differences in group affiliation may affect the level of cooperation in commons situations such as complex international negotiations over the preservation of the rainforest. In this example, one might expect individuals from the north to show strong support for conservation because they receive mostly non-extractive benefits from the forest (e.g., clean air). However, locals may act with less restraint for two reasons: (1) much more of the benefits coming from the forest are resources that are extracted, and (2) compounding the first reason, local individuals may resist being told to conserve by outsiders. We design a real-time, cross-cultural common pool resource (CPR) experiment purposely using participants from cultures that derive different benefits from biodiversity (extraction versus conservation) to analyze the effect of group affiliation on cooperative behavior. In addition, we elicit real donations to local and international conservation funds to augment our CPR results. In the CPR environment, we find evidence that group affiliation affects behavior. American students maintain their extraction in the mixed treatment (both Colombian and American participants) compared to homogeneous groups (American only), while Colombian participants extract more in the mixed treatment. We also witness negative reciprocity by exploited subgroups. Here subgroups that extract less in one period (i.e., are exploited) tend to extract more in the future and the magnitude of this adjustment is determined by participant nationality and our treatments. In the donation stage, we show that nationality affects how much participants are willing to donate of their first-stage earnings to a conservation fund. We also examine the possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in that, they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject global commons en_US
dc.subject heterogeneity en_US
dc.subject culture en_US
dc.subject reciprocity en_US
dc.subject altruism en_US
dc.subject nationalism en_US
dc.subject experimental economics en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject cooperation--theory en_US
dc.subject behavior--comparative analysis en_US
dc.title Using Cross-Cultural Experiments to Understand the Dynamics of Global Commons en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.coverage.region North America en_US
dc.coverage.region South America en_US
dc.coverage.country United States, Columbia en_US
dc.subject.sector Global Commons en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Colloquium at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates March 18, 2002 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Indiana University, Bloomington, IN en_US

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