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Abstract:
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"This is a theoretical, conceptual contribution related to fisheries. Many common properties around the world have become scarce and potentially valuable because of increased population, and improved technologies: water, forests, grazing lands, waterfowl, mammals, reptiles, fisheries, radio and TV spectrum, geostationary satellite positions, airport take-off and landing slots, air-we-breathe, the gene-pool, etc. Who is going to benefit form these common resources? The scarce common resources cannot be valuable unless one has title to them -- title over their entire range during their life. After establishing jurisdiction and title there is political decision or consensus as to who benefits from these scarce common resources. This is followed by legislative and executive decisions to set up and operate institutions to carry out political decision or consensus as to who benefits. These common resources can be classified according to use: (1) required for sustaining life; (2) contingency for later unspecified use' (3) recreation; and (4) commercial. This allocation will change over time as population and technologies change. One political decision: Is allocation done once for all time or is it continuous over time? What are the problems and consequences?"
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