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The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach

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dc.contributor.author Gardner, Roy
dc.contributor.author Morris, Molly R.
dc.contributor.author Walton, Rod
dc.date.accessioned 2009-11-23T21:18:58Z
dc.date.available 2009-11-23T21:18:58Z
dc.date.issued 1987 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5208
dc.description.abstract "This paper studies the contest behaviour of territorial animals, where a contest begins with an explicit signalling stage. A resident has a choice of two signals, denoting either strong or weak resource holding power. A signal constitutes a bluff when a weak resident signals strong; bluffing, however, entails a cost. An intruder must then assess the signal before choosing whether to attack or retreat. The equilibrium concept applied is that of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). For the contests we model, there is a unique ESS. The ESS depends crucially on the asymmetry of information between residents and intruders, as well as on the value of a territory V and cost of losing a contest C. When the ration V/C is low and residents have better information than intruders, all weak residents bluff, but bluffing decreases as V/C rises." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject information--theory en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.title The Evolution of Bluffing in Animal Contests: An ESS Approach en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference International Conference on Game Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates June 20, 1987 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Stony Brook, New York en_US

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