|
|
|
PDF
|
|
Type:
|
Working Paper |
|
Author:
|
Gardner, Roy; Moore, Michael R.; Walker, James M. |
|
Date:
|
1994 |
|
Agency:
|
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloomington, IN |
|
Series:
|
Working Paper W94-7 |
|
URI:
|
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5209
|
|
Sector:
|
Water Resource & Irrigation |
|
Region:
|
|
|
Subject(s):
|
groundwater--models
water resources
game theory
Workshop
|
|
Abstract:
|
"This paper examines strategic behavior in the context of a dynamic common-pool resource game with a unique symmetric subgame equilibrium. Solving the model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Baseline experiments, which portray a 'rule of capture' for establishing ownership with group size equal to 10, achieve an average efficiency of 30%. Experiments that restrict entry, with group size equal to 5, increase average efficiency to 44%. Experiments applying a stock quota show more marked improvement in efficiency, averaging 54%. The stock quota experiments come closest to producing data consistent with subgame perfection."
|