| dc.contributor.author |
Gardner, Roy |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Moore, Michael R. |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Walker, James M. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2009-11-23T21:22:23Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2009-11-23T21:22:23Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1994 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5209 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper examines strategic behavior in the context of a dynamic common-pool resource game with a unique symmetric subgame equilibrium. Solving the model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Baseline experiments, which portray a 'rule of capture' for establishing ownership with group size equal to 10, achieve an average efficiency of 30%. Experiments that restrict entry, with group size equal to 5, increase average efficiency to 44%. Experiments applying a stock quota show more marked improvement in efficiency, averaging 54%. The stock quota experiments come closest to producing data consistent with subgame perfection." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Working Paper W94-7 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
groundwater--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
water resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Managing a Groundwater Commons |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloomington, IN |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Water Resource & Irrigation |
en_US |