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Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Managing a Groundwater Commons

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dc.contributor.author Gardner, Roy
dc.contributor.author Moore, Michael R.
dc.contributor.author Walker, James M.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-11-23T21:22:23Z
dc.date.available 2009-11-23T21:22:23Z
dc.date.issued 1994 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5209
dc.description.abstract "This paper examines strategic behavior in the context of a dynamic common-pool resource game with a unique symmetric subgame equilibrium. Solving the model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Baseline experiments, which portray a 'rule of capture' for establishing ownership with group size equal to 10, achieve an average efficiency of 30%. Experiments that restrict entry, with group size equal to 5, increase average efficiency to 44%. Experiments applying a stock quota show more marked improvement in efficiency, averaging 54%. The stock quota experiments come closest to producing data consistent with subgame perfection." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Working Paper W94-7 en_US
dc.subject groundwater--models en_US
dc.subject water resources en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject Workshop en_US
dc.title Racing for the Water: Laboratory Evidence on Managing a Groundwater Commons en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University Bloomington, IN en_US
dc.subject.sector Water Resource & Irrigation en_US

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