Bribery, Regulators, and Firms: Corruption in the S & L Industry, 1982-1989

Found at: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5312
PDF
Type:	Conference Paper
Author:	Gardner, Roy; Güth, Werner
Conference:	Conference on Game Theory in the Behavioral Sciences
Location:	Frankfurt, Germany
Conf. Date:	September 10, 1992
Date:	1992
URI:	https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5312
Sector:	Social Organization Theory
Region:	North America
Subject(s):	Workshop game theory firm--theory regulation corruption
Abstract:	"A bribe is anything, usually money, offered to someone to do something illegal. This paper builds a simple 2-player, 2-sided incomplete information game with bribery as one of its strategic possibilities. The paper then solves the game using all dominant strategies available at equilibrium. There is a nondegenerate subset of the parameter space where all firms in financial difficulty offer bribes to their regulators, and all dishonest regulators accept these bribes. The model is applied to developments in the Savings & Loan industry of the United States, 1982-89."

Files in this item

Files	Size	Format	View
Gardner--Briber ... and l industry 1982-89.pdf	112.5Kb	PDF	View/Open