Image Database Export Citations


Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Falk, Armin
dc.contributor.author Fehr, Ernst
dc.contributor.author Fischbacher, Urs
dc.date.accessioned 2010-01-04T15:02:14Z
dc.date.available 2010-01-04T15:02:14Z
dc.date.issued 2001 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5314
dc.description.abstract "In this paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. When communication or informal sanctions are available, however, appropriation behaviour is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Discussion Paper, no. 2925 en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject reciprocity en_US
dc.subject experimental economics en_US
dc.subject common pool resources--models en_US
dc.subject fairness--models en_US
dc.subject monitoring and sanctioning--models en_US
dc.title Appropriating the Commons: A Theoretical Explanation en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Centre for Economic Policy Research, London en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Falk--Appropria ... heoretical explanation.pdf 422.6Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record