dc.contributor.author |
Ostrom, Elinor |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2010-02-02T16:56:53Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2010-02-02T16:56:53Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
1999 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5465 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
"Farmer organizations are responsible for the governance and management of a wide variety of common-pool resources (CPRs) including irrigation systems, pasture lands, community-owned forests, as well as their own 'budgetary commons' involved in organizing a wide diversity of cooperative activities. All CPRs are jointly used by a community of individuals where one person's use subtracts from the amount
available to others. It is typically difficult to exclude potential beneficiaries from gaining access to a CPR. A wide diversity of literature written during the past two decades focuses on how individuals organize themselves to manage diverse kinds of CPRs." |
en_US |
dc.language |
English |
en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Workshop Working Paper W99-6 |
en_US |
dc.subject |
design principles |
en_US |
dc.subject |
sustainability |
en_US |
dc.subject |
rules |
en_US |
dc.subject |
compliance |
en_US |
dc.subject |
community participation |
en_US |
dc.subject |
institutional design |
en_US |
dc.subject |
CIPEC |
en_US |
dc.subject |
common pool resources--theory |
en_US |
dc.subject |
Workshop |
en_US |
dc.title |
Design Principles and Threats to Sustainable Organizations that Manage Commons |
en_US |
dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN |
en_US |
dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |