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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Shepsle, Kenneth A.; Weingast, Barry R. |
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Date:
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1986 |
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Agency:
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School of Business and Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis, MO |
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Series:
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Political Economy Working Papers, no. 105 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5471
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Sector:
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Social Organization |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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committees
power
legislature
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Abstract:
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"Committees and their jurisdictions constitute a division and- specialization-of-labor in a legislature. Committees are alleged to be powerful in their respective jurisdictions because they can (i) veto changes in the status quo (ex ante veto power) and (ii) initiate changes in the status quo (proposal power). The authors demonstrate that these are insufficient to sustain committee power because committee non-members have strategies available to mitigate ex ante veto power (e.g. discharge petition) and to alter committee proposals (e.g. amendments). What, then, accounts for committee power? Much of the
traditional legislative literature alludes to the notion of 'deference,' viz., that legislators participate in an institutional bargain in which each defers to committee member judgments in exchange for reciprocal deference to his own judgments when he sits as a committee member. The authors inquire into what underlies this phenomenon. They emphasize explicit enforcement mechanisms that allow committee to discourage noncommittee members from employing strategies
inimical to committee interests. Specifically, they point to conference committees as the institutional manifestation of ex post veto power which gives force to ex ante veto power and proposal power."
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