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Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions

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dc.contributor.author Shepsle, Kenneth A.
dc.contributor.author Weingast, Barry R.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-02-02T17:29:07Z
dc.date.available 2010-02-02T17:29:07Z
dc.date.issued 1981 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5473
dc.description.abstract "This paper examines the properties of majority-rule institutions given fully strategic behavior by all agents. Results are provided, characterizing majority-rule outcomes, for several alternative agenda institutions. The main conclusion is that institutional arrangements, specifically mechanisms of agenda construction, impose constraints on majority outcomes. In the last decade multidimensional voting models have become subtle and complex instruments for explicating social choices by majority rule. What has been learned from them is that little will be known about an institution based on majority rule if the focus is exclusively upon the majority preference relation between alternatives." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject voting en_US
dc.subject majority rule en_US
dc.title Uncovered Sets and Sophisticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates 1981 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc New York en_US

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