hidden
Image Database Export Citations

Menu:

Veto Games: Spatial Committees under Unanimity Rule

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Chen, Yan
dc.contributor.author Ordeshook, Peter C.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-03-23T15:54:30Z
dc.date.available 2010-03-23T15:54:30Z
dc.date.issued 1993 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5658
dc.description.abstract "There exists a large literature on two-person bargaining games and distribution games (or divide-the-dollar games) under simple majority rule, where in equilibrium a minimal winning coalition takes full advantage over everyone else. Here we extend the study to an n-person veto game where players take turns proposing policies in an n-dimensional policy space and everybody has a veto over changes in the status quo. Briefly, we find a Nash equilibrium where the initial proposer offers a policy in the intersection of the Pareto optimal set and the Pareto superior set that gives everyone their continuation values, and punishments are never implemented. Comparing the equilibrium outcomes under two different agendas - sequential recognition and random recognition - we find that there are advantages generated by the order of proposal under the sequential recognition rule. We also provide some conditions under which the players will prefer to rotate proposals rather than allow any specific policy to prevail indefinitely." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Social Science Working Paper, no. 847 en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject price en_US
dc.subject institutional design en_US
dc.subject markets--models en_US
dc.title Veto Games: Spatial Committees under Unanimity Rule en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Veto games spat ... s under unanimity rule.pdf 662.0Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record