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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Nightingale, Andrea |
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Date:
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1998 |
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Agency:
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MacArthur Interdisciplinary Program on Peace and International Cooperation, Institute of International Studies, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN |
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Series:
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MacArthur Consortium Working Paper Series |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5662
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Sector:
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Forestry
General & Multiple Resources |
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Region:
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Middle East & South Asia |
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Subject(s):
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common pool resources
gender
inequality
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Abstract:
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"Common property regimes have been shown to help alleviate inequalities within communities by providing all members access to common pool resources. In addition, many common property regimes have managed specific resources over long periods of time without degrading the resource base. These two qualities have led to increasing recognition that common property regimes offer more sustainable alternatives compared to private property regimes. Environmental and social sustainablity are interconnected given that environmental costs must be eventually paid, and environmental destruction often has the greatest impact on the poorest segments of society. Common property regimes can promote the development of sustainable societies through resource sharing but the internal dynamics of these regimes must be examined. Common property regimes can be the site of gender, class and caste struggles. These struggles can lead to unequal power sharing in management decisions, even when all stake holders participate in the decision making process. The unequal nature of this process can lead to non-compliance. Both the scale and the ecological impact of non-compliance need further systematic investigation. The success of common property regimes may be related to their ability to tolerate some non-compliance but social and ecological limits to that flexibility exist. This paper presents a case study from northwestern Nepal to illustrate these issues and to ask questions that arise from the examples. Understanding these inequalities and how they structure both the common property regime and the management decisions made within the regime are critical if one is interested in promoting similar institutions in other parts of the world or for other common pool resources."
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