| dc.contributor.author |
Ostrom, Elinor |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-03-26T19:21:09Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-03-26T19:21:09Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1997 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5674 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Common-pool resources are systems that generate finite quantities of resource units so that one person's use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others. Irrigation systems are among the most important type of common-pool resource. Most common-pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can simultaneously use the resource system and efforts to exclude potential beneficiaries are costly. When the resource units (e.g., water) are highly valued and many actors benefit from appropriating(harvesting) them for consumption, exchange, or as a factor in a production process, the appropriations made by one individual are likely to create negative externalities for others." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.publisher |
Workshop Working Paper Series no. W97-18 |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof |
ARE Handbook |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Workshop Working Paper Series no. W97-18 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
tragedy of the commons |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources--theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
self-governance--theory |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory (Draft) |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Book Chapter |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
unpublished |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Case Study |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |