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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Chen, Yan; Ordeshook, Peter C. |
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Date:
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1993 |
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Agency:
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Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA |
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Series:
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Social Science Working Paper, no. 859 |
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5682
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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game theory
constitution--theory
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Abstract:
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"Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria - one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so."
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