dc.contributor.author |
Chen, Yan |
|
dc.contributor.author |
Ordeshook, Peter C. |
|
dc.date.accessioned |
2010-04-08T16:04:42Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2010-04-08T16:04:42Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
1993 |
en_US |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5682 |
|
dc.description.abstract |
"Taking the view that constitutions are devices whereby people coordinate to specific equilibria in circumstances that allow multiple equilibria, we show that a constitutional secession clause can serve as such a device and, therefore, that such a clause is more than an empty promise or an ineffectual threat. Employing a simple three-person recursive game, we establish that under certain conditions, this game possesses two equilibria - one in which a disadvantaged federal unit secedes and is not punished by the other units in the federation, and a second equilibrium in which this unit does not secede but is punished if it chooses to do so." |
en_US |
dc.language |
English |
en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Social Science Working Paper, no. 859 |
en_US |
dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
dc.subject |
constitution--theory |
en_US |
dc.title |
Constitutional Secession Clauses |
en_US |
dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA |
en_US |
dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |