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Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity

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dc.contributor.author Sethi, Rajiv
dc.contributor.author Somanathan, E.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-04-19T18:44:36Z
dc.date.available 2010-04-19T18:44:36Z
dc.date.issued 2001 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5708
dc.description.abstract "Strong reciprocity refers to the willingness to sacrifice one's own material self interest to punish others for opportunistic actions. This propensity provides a decentralized mechanism for the enforcement of social norms, but its extent and persistence poses a theoretical puzzle. Since opportunistic individuals choose optimally to comply with or violate norms based on the likelihood and severity of sanctioning they anticipate, such individuals will always outperform reciprocators within any group. The presence of reciprocators in a group can, however, alter the behavior of opportunists in such a manner as to benefit all members of the group (including reciprocators). We show that under these circumstances, reciprocators can invade a population of opportunists when groups dissolve and are formed anew according to a process of purely random (non-assortative) matching. Furthermore, even when these conditions are not satisfied (so that an opportunistic population is stable) there may exist additional stable population states in which reciprocators are present." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject reciprocity en_US
dc.subject social behavior en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject norms en_US
dc.subject economic theory en_US
dc.subject compliance en_US
dc.title Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Workshop on the Structure and Evolution of Strong Reciprocity en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates March 9-11 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico en_US

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