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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Güth, Werner; Ritzberger, Klaus |
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Date:
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1992 |
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Agency:
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Series:
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5763
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Sector:
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Theory |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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emigration and immigration
game theory
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Abstract:
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"In Europe we face very different living standards in different
countries. In former times such discrepancies did not induce mass migration since mobility was restricted, especially between Eastern and
Western European countries. But now the relatively richer countries
are confronted with mass immigration and also strong resistance against
it. We will show that resistance against mass immigration can be explained as being genetically determined. Specifically, we will analyse a very simple game model of immigration with an undetermined preference parameter deciding whether an incumbent engages into opposition against mass immigration or not. It is shown that preference for fighting against mass immigration is the only evolutionarily stable strategy for all possible parameter constellations. In our view this has important political implications regardless whether one wants to argue for a more liberal immigration low or against it."
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