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An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Dufwenberg, Martin; Gneezy, Uri; Güth, Werner; van Damme, Eric
Date: 2000
Agency: Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany
Series: Discussion Paper, Economic Series, no. 158
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5764
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): trust
game theory
experimental economics
Abstract: "Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier 'hide behind the small one?', how do receivers respond to the different situations?"

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