| dc.contributor.author |
Dufwenberg, Martin |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Gneezy, Uri |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Güth, Werner |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
van Damme, Eric |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-05-04T15:52:26Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-05-04T15:52:26Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2000 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5764 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"Direct reciprocity means to respond in kind to another person whereas
indirect reciprocity is understood here as rewarding someone else. We perform corresponding experiments which use a similar underlying structure as the reciprocity experiment of Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). Another variation concerns the information about the multiplier of donations where we compare the benchmark case with a commonly known multiplier to a condition where the multiplier is known for sure only by donators. Questions which we try to answer are: Will indirect reciprocity induce higher or lower donations?, will donators with the high multiplier 'hide behind the small one?', how do receivers respond to the different situations?" |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Discussion Paper, Economic Series, no. 158 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
trust |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
reciprocity |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
game theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
altruism |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
experimental economics |
en_US |
| dc.title |
An Experimental Test of Direct and Indirect Reciprocity in Case of Complete and Incomplete Information |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Humboldt-Universität Zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin, Germany |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |