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Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games

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Type: Working Paper
Author: Güth, Werner; Kirchsteiger, Georg; Ritzberger, Klaus
Date: 1995
Agency: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultat, Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Series: Discussion Paper: Economic Series no. 81
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5766
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): game theory
Abstract: "In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs."

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