| dc.contributor.author |
Germain, Marc |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Toint, Philippe |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Tulkens, Henry |
|
| dc.contributor.editor |
Faucheux, S. |
|
| dc.contributor.editor |
Gowdy, J. |
|
| dc.contributor.editor |
Nicolai, I. |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-05-26T19:34:27Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-05-26T19:34:27Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
1998 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5784 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems (for example, greenhouse gas emissions, acid rain, pollution of international waters) requires cooperation among the countries involved if a social optimum is to be achieved. The issues raised thereby have often been addressed, in the economic literature, using concepts borrowed from cooperative game theory." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.publisher |
Edward Elgar |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof |
Sustainability and Firms: Technological Change and the Changing Regulatory Environment |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
simulations |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
cooperation--models |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
international relations |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
pollution |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Financial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatement |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Book Chapter |
en_US |
| dc.type.published |
published |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Modeling |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Global Commons |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationpages |
205-219 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.citationpubloc |
Cheltenham |
en_US |