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Financial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatement

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dc.contributor.author Germain, Marc
dc.contributor.author Toint, Philippe
dc.contributor.author Tulkens, Henry
dc.contributor.editor Faucheux, S.
dc.contributor.editor Gowdy, J.
dc.contributor.editor Nicolai, I.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-05-26T19:34:27Z
dc.date.available 2010-05-26T19:34:27Z
dc.date.issued 1998 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5784
dc.description.abstract "It is well known that the transnational character of many environmental problems (for example, greenhouse gas emissions, acid rain, pollution of international waters) requires cooperation among the countries involved if a social optimum is to be achieved. The issues raised thereby have often been addressed, in the economic literature, using concepts borrowed from cooperative game theory." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.publisher Edward Elgar en_US
dc.relation.ispartof Sustainability and Firms: Technological Change and the Changing Regulatory Environment en_US
dc.subject simulations en_US
dc.subject cooperation--models en_US
dc.subject international relations en_US
dc.subject pollution en_US
dc.title Financial Transfers to Sustain Cooperative International Optimality in Stock Pollutant Abatement en_US
dc.type Book Chapter en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Modeling en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, Belgium en_US
dc.subject.sector Global Commons en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages 205-219 en_US
dc.identifier.citationpubloc Cheltenham en_US

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