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A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution

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dc.contributor.author Chander, Parkash
dc.contributor.author Tulkens, Henry
dc.date.accessioned 2010-05-26T20:24:43Z
dc.date.available 2010-05-26T20:24:43Z
dc.date.issued 1994 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5789
dc.description.abstract "For a simple economic model of transfrontier pollution, widely used in theoretical studies of international treaties bearing on joint abatement, we exhibit in this paper a scheme for sharing national abatement costs, through international financial transfers, which is inspired by a very classical solution concept offered in the theory of cooperative games, namely the 'core' of a game. The scheme has the following properties: (i) total damage and abatement costs in all countries are minimized (optimality property), and (ii) no 'coalition', i.e. subset, of countries can achieve lower such total costs for its members by taking another course of action in terms of emissions and/or transfers, under some reasonable assumption as to the reactions of those not in the coalition (core property)." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Beijer Discussion Paper Series no. 51 en_US
dc.subject global commons en_US
dc.subject pollution en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject cooperation en_US
dc.title A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm en_US
dc.subject.sector Global Commons en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US

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