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Rational Voters and Strategic Voting: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, and 1992 Elections

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dc.contributor.author Ordeshook, Peter C.
dc.contributor.author Zeng, Langche
dc.date.accessioned 2010-05-28T15:02:16Z
dc.date.available 2010-05-28T15:02:16Z
dc.date.issued 1994 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5796
dc.description.abstract "Is the rational choice paradigm more than a mere tautology when applied to the study of voting or can it generate refutable propositions that cannot be deduced or inferred from other approaches? This is the question we address empirically in the context of three-candidate presidential elections. Although we reconfirm the conclusion that the decision to vote is largely a consumptive one, we also establish that once in the voting booth, voters act strategically in precisely the ways predicted by a Downsian model of voting. That is, although expected utility calculations and the like add little to our understanding of the decision to vote, those same calculations have a significant influence on the decision for whom to vote, over and above such things as partisanship." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Social Science Working Paper 901 en_US
dc.subject elections en_US
dc.subject rationality en_US
dc.subject voting en_US
dc.title Rational Voters and Strategic Voting: Evidence from the 1968, 1980, and 1992 Elections en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA en_US
dc.coverage.region North America en_US
dc.coverage.country United States en_US
dc.subject.sector Social Organization en_US

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