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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Loehman, Edna T.; Dinar, Ariel |
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Date:
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1992 |
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Agency:
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Series:
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5809
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Sector:
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Water Resource & Irrigation |
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Region:
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North America |
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Subject(s):
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irrigation
common pool resources
mechanism design
externalities
cooperation
conflict resolution
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Abstract:
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"Cooperative technology improvements may ameliorate externalities, and
potentially produce Pareto superior outcomes compared to noncooperative
abatement strategies, but they may not be adopted without appropriate
institutional mechanisms. To achieve cooperative outcomes, there is the need for institutional mechanisms giving incentives for adoption of
cooperative technologies. Here, the design of a process and a solution
algorithm is proposed based on combining welfare economic principles and games proposed for public goods, common property resources and externality problems. Concepts are applied to an irrigation externality problem in the Central Valley of California to demonstrate existence of a unanimously acceptable solution."
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