hidden
Image Database Export Citations

Menu:

Cost Share Adjustment Process for Public Goods: Exploring Alternative Institutions for Coordination Under Heterogeneity

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Loehman, Edna T.
dc.contributor.author Kiser, Richard
dc.contributor.author Rassenti, Stephen J.
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-04T18:25:48Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-04T18:25:48Z
dc.date.issued 2001 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5813
dc.description.abstract "This paper reports experimental comparison of four institutions or mechanisms for group decision about cost-sharing for a public good when there is heterogeneity in endowments and rewards. The foundation for design of these institutions is an optimizing algorithm for finding group agreement. Three of the institutions are based on price-taking behavior: each group member selects a quantity given a personalized cost schedule. The fourth mechanism is similar to a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism in its use of bids, but it includes optimizing features. Three of the four use some form of bidding. To compare these institutions experimentally, each was embedded in a game of group decision through which a group could locate a unanimous agreement among proposals. Testing confirmed that the nature of institutional rules can greatly affect individual behavior and cooperation in groups." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject experimental economics en_US
dc.subject cost benefit analysis en_US
dc.subject rules en_US
dc.subject cooperation--theory en_US
dc.subject decision making en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.title Cost Share Adjustment Process for Public Goods: Exploring Alternative Institutions for Coordination Under Heterogeneity en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Experimental en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US


Files in this item

Files Size Format View
Cost share adju ... on under heterogeneity.pdf 520.6Kb PDF View/Open

This item appears in the following document type(s)

Show simple item record