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Cost Sharing for Public Goods: Exploring Alternative Institutions for Coordination under Heterogeneity

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Type: Conference Paper
Author: Loehman, Edna T.; Kiser, Richard; Rassenti, Stephen J.
Conference: Public Choice Society Meetings
Location: San Diego, CA
Conf. Date: March 21-24
Date: 2002
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5821
Sector: Theory
Subject(s): game theory
decision making--theory
public goods and bads--theory
Abstract: "Four institutions for group decision about cost-sharing for a public good are compared here experimentally. Three of the institutions are based on price-taking behavior. The fourth mechanism is similar to a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism in its use of bids. Three of the four use some form of bid messages. Design of each institution is based on an underlying coordination algorithm. The common experimental game framework includes unanimity voting to select the group outcome and provide an incentive against free-riding. The experimental environment exhibits heterogeneity in endowments and rewards. Testing confirmed that the nature of institutional rules affect individual behavior and group decision."

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