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Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information

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dc.contributor.author Ordeshook, Peter C.
dc.contributor.author Palfrey, Thomas
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-11T13:56:23Z
dc.date.available 2010-06-11T13:56:23Z
dc.date.issued 1986 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/5832
dc.description.abstract "The literature on agendas with sincere and strategic voting represents an important contribution to our understanding of committees, of institutions, and of the opportunities to manipulate outcomes by the manipulation of institutions. That literature, though, imposes an assumption that may be unrealistic in many situations; namely, that everyone knows the preferences of everyone else. In this essay we apply Bayesian equilibrium analysis to show that the properties of agendas that others derive assuming complete information do not hold necessarily under incomplete information. First, a Condorcet winner need not be selected , even if nearly everyone on the committee most prefers it. Second, the '2 step theorem,' that any outcome reachable in voting stages via some amendment agenda is reachable in two stages under sophisticated voting, need not hold. Third, nonbinding votes such as straw polls, can critically effect final outcomes." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries Social Science Working Papers, no. 618 en_US
dc.subject Bayesian learning en_US
dc.subject voting--models en_US
dc.subject committees--models en_US
dc.title Agendas, Strategic Voting, and Signaling with Incomplete Information en_US
dc.type Working Paper en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.publisher.workingpaperseries California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US

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