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PDF
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Type:
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Working Paper |
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Author:
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Ueda, Yoshifumi; Wegener, Andraes; Svendsen, Gert T. |
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Date:
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2010 |
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Agency:
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Series:
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URI:
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https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6160
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Sector:
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Global Commons
Social Organization |
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Region:
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Subject(s):
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commons
collective action
social behavior
nonprofit sector
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Abstract:
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"With a view to applying to the problem of collective action for the global commons, we analyze a three-stage game model where public goods are provided by the costly leadership of a social entrepreneur for undertaking 'eco-goods' scheme. We derive (i) the conclusion that the social entrepreneur can finance more for the collective action under not-for-profit constraint than without the constraint, and (ii) the conditions under which he prefers the not-for-profit constraint on a rational basis. The main results are applied to some social experiments on the natural common-pools of a public-goods nature in the river-basins communities of Japan."
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