| dc.contributor.author |
Engel, Christoph |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-09-22T19:35:44Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-09-22T19:35:44Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2007 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6364 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"By its critics, the rational choice model is routinely accused of being unrealistic. One key objection has it that, for all nontrivial problems, calculating the best response is cognitively way too taxing, given the severe cognitive limitations of the human mind. If one confines the analysis to consciously controlled decision-making, this criticism is certainly warranted. But it ignores a second mental apparatus. Unlike conscious deliberation, this apparatus does not work serially but in parallel. It handles huge amounts of information in almost no time. It only is not consciously accessible. Only the end result is propelled back to consciousness as an intuition." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2007/12 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
institutional design |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
incentives |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
prisoner's dilemma |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
uncertainty |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
rational choice theory |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
decision making |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Institutions for Intuitive Man |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Theory |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Theory |
en_US |