| dc.contributor.author |
Jordahl, Henrik |
|
| dc.contributor.author |
Liang, Che-Yuan |
|
| dc.date.accessioned |
2010-10-01T18:30:48Z |
|
| dc.date.available |
2010-10-01T18:30:48Z |
|
| dc.date.issued |
2009 |
en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri |
https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6448 |
|
| dc.description.abstract |
"This paper uses the Swedish municipal amalgamation reform of 1952 to study the common pool problem in politics. The amalgams were common pools and the municipalities had incentives to free-ride on their amalgam partners by increasing debt prior to amalgamation. We find that municipalities that merged in 1952 increased their debt between 1948 and 1952 when the reform could be anticipated. The increase amounted to 52% of new debt issued or 1.5% of total revenues in the merged municipalities. But contrary to the 'law of 1/n', free-riding did not increase in common pool size." |
en_US |
| dc.language |
English |
en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Uppsala University Economics Working Paper No. 2006:27 |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
free riding |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
common pool resources |
en_US |
| dc.subject |
local governance and politics |
en_US |
| dc.title |
Merged Municipalities, Higher Debt: On Free-Riding and the Common Pool Problem in Politics |
en_US |
| dc.type |
Working Paper |
en_US |
| dc.type.methodology |
Summary Report |
en_US |
| dc.publisher.workingpaperseries |
Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Sweden |
en_US |
| dc.subject.sector |
Social Organization |
en_US |