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Join the Leader, Imitate or Follow: Evolutionary Stable Strategies in the Commons

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dc.contributor.author Schott, Stephan
dc.date.accessioned 2010-10-29T19:52:31Z
dc.date.available 2010-10-29T19:52:31Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6532
dc.description.abstract "We develop an evolutionary game theory model for a limited access common pool resource. With full disclosure of individual extraction decisions and payoffs we conjecture that subjects will imitate the most successful players’ strategy as long as their payoffs increase. We derive a stable asymmetric equilibrium of Stackelberg leaders and followers that predicts larger aggregate extraction than the symmetric Nash equilibrium but less than the complete rent dissipation scenario. We also formally model the effect of electronic communication on individual behaviour and the stability of coalition formation. As opposed to previous findings in the CPR literature we observe that full information disclosure significantly changes individual behaviour and aggregate use of the common property. Groups that had complete information about other subject’s behaviour extracted significantly more from the CPR, which is consistent with our evolutionary stable equilibrium predictions. Cooperation with E-mail communication is a function of the number of self-identified cooperators and as predicted reduces aggregate extraction but does not reach full efficiency. Full information and communication leads to the formation of smaller coalitions, and, therefore, larger aggregate extraction from the common pool than communication without full information disclosure." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject experimental economics en_US
dc.subject communication en_US
dc.subject information en_US
dc.subject common pool resources en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.subject income distribution en_US
dc.subject inequality en_US
dc.title Join the Leader, Imitate or Follow: Evolutionary Stable Strategies in the Commons en_US
dc.type Conference Paper en_US
dc.type.published unpublished en_US
dc.type.methodology Theory en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationconference Capturing the Complexity of the Commons, North American Regional Meeting of the International Association for the Study of the Commons en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfdates Sep. 30-Oct. 2 en_US
dc.identifier.citationconfloc Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ en_US

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