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Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium

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dc.contributor.author Sandholm, William H.
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-14T21:10:50Z
dc.date.available 2011-01-14T21:10:50Z
dc.date.issued 2009 en_US
dc.identifier.uri https://hdl.handle.net/10535/6812
dc.description.abstract "We introduce a class of evolutionary game dynamics--pairwise comparison dynamics--under which revising agents choose a candidate strategy at random, switching to it with positive probability if and only if its payoff is higher than the agent’s current strategy. We prove that all such dynamics satisfy Nash stationarity: the set of rest points of these dynamics is always identical to the set of Nash equilibria of the underlying game. We also show how one can modify the replicator dynamic and other imitative dynamics to ensure Nash stationarity without increasing the informational demands placed on the agents. These results provide an interpretation of Nash equilibrium that relies on large numbers arguments and weak requirements on payoff observations rather than on strong equilibrium knowledge assumptions." en_US
dc.language English en_US
dc.subject Nash equilibrium en_US
dc.subject game theory en_US
dc.title Pairwise Comparison Dynamics and Evolutionary Foundations for Nash Equilibrium en_US
dc.type Journal Article en_US
dc.type.published published en_US
dc.type.methodology Case Study en_US
dc.subject.sector Theory en_US
dc.identifier.citationjournal Games en_US
dc.identifier.citationvolume 1 en_US
dc.identifier.citationpages 3-17 en_US

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